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THE END OF FREE EXERCISE?
John T. Noonan, Jr.*
Beginning with the Bill of Rights, we had an absolutely unique
constitutional provision for a nation, stating, "Congress shall make
no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . . ."I There had been nothing like it in his-
tory. You could, of course, find something like it in several of the
colonies and something like it in Virginia after it threw off the Brit-
ish Crown, but the full embrace of both no establishment and free
exercise was unique for a nation. Nothing comparable anytime, any-
where, could be found among national states.
Current usage, I am afraid, refers to "the religion clauses" - an
unfortunate usage that I think Justice Black was responsible for, at
least introducing it into decisions of the Supreme Court.' There are
no clauses in the constitutional provision. Clauses have a subject and
predicate. This provision has a single subject, a single verb, and two
prepositional phrases. It is a shabby and inadmissable technique to
put the two prepositional phrases dealing with religion into conflict
with each other as a statement that with any fidelity to the text
should be read as one.
After the reference to religion, the text continues with provisions
respecting other objects such as the press or speech as to which
Congress shall make no law. It is, I think, essential to see the whole
set of prohibitions as going together and supporting each other.
They are not independent and isolated admonitions. They are a
whole, limiting governmental intrusion into a precious personal
zone.
Religion comes first in this enumeration of basic rights in the Bill
of Rights. Religion as a discrete, identifiable subject is part of the
text. It is embarrassing for people today because religion does not
have the same definiteness and clarity that it had in the eighteenth
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This Article is adapted from
the DePaul College of Law's Center for Church/State Studies 1992 Annual Lecture.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1949).
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century. The difficulty is not imported; it is created by the text. We
have to have some notion of what religion is if we are going to inter-
pret the key term in the first part of this enumeration of our basic
constitutional rights.
The Founding Fathers made the commitment; they enshrined
freedom in the text. What happened next? I intend to examine the
history of the amendment prior to 1940, then to look at the history
from 1940 to 1990, and finally to look at the present situation.
What happened after the First Amendment was enacted was that
it had, so far as can be seen, absolutely no impact on the state gov-
ernments. It did not speak of the state governments or to them. The
state governments did not feel bound by any restriction of the Bill of
Rights. The Supreme Court did not apply the Bill of Rights to the
states. Several of the states had religious establishments that contin-
ued to flourish after the Bill of Rights was enacted.
Take my natal state of Massachusetts. The constitution of Massa-
chusetts in its first section, A Declaration of the Rights of the In-
habitants of the Commonwealth, declared that there was free exer-
cise of religion; and at the same time this section of the constitution
established the Congregational Church (in fact, not by name) as the
state church of Massachusetts and imposed upon the cities and
towns of Massachusetts the obligation of raising taxes to pay for the
Congregational ministry in the various municipalities.3 This finan-
cial establishment of the church was described approvingly by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as a classic establishment
of religion.4 It was supplemented by another portion of the constitu-
tion of Massachusetts itself which imposed an antipapist oath. No
governor, lieutenant governor, counselor, senator, or representative
in Massachusetts could hold office without repudiating both the
temporal and spiritual sovereignty of the pope.'
The constitution of Massachusetts eventually changed, not be-
cause of the Bill of Rights, but because of demographic changes in
the commonwealth. Baptists and Catholics moved into Massachu-
setts. Even more importantly, perhaps, a split occurred between the
3. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, arts. II, III. A majority of men in any town could, under this
provision, establish another Protestant church in their town, but as John Adams said, no one
expected the Congregationalist "establishment" to change. 2 ISAAC BACKUS, A HISTORY OF NEw
ENGLAND WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE DENOMINATION OF CHRISTIANS CALLED BAP-
TISTS 201-02 n.2 (Edwin S. Gaustad ed., Arno Press & The New York Times 1969 (1871)).
4. Barnes v. First Parish, 6 Mass. 334, 338 (1810).
5. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, art. I.
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Congregationalists and Unitarians, leading to the Unitarians taking
over a large number of the Congregational churches and making the
Congregationalists realize that establishment was not very pleasant,
if you were no longer the established church.6 So in 1833 the consti-
tution was changed. Religious freedom did come to Massachusetts
two generations after the Revolution, but it was not due to the Bill
of Rights.
The Bill of Rights also had no apparent impact on Congress and
the president. The same Congress that enacted the First Amend-
ment established a chaplaincy for Congress so that chaplains would
be paid by, and pray for, the Congress.7 The same Congress estab-
lished an army chaplain so that the military would have religious
services paid for by the federal government.8 The same Congress
created a fund for the promotion of religious education in the vast
Northwest Territory.' The same Congress asked George Washing-
ton to establish a day of prayer.1"
Subsequent presidents went right on praying in public, establish-
ing days of prayer for the country, asking God in the name of the
country to forgive the sins of the country or thanking God in the
name of the country. There continued to be a very public profession
of religion by the nation's chief magistrate. 1 Even Madison, who
may have felt the scruples he later, out of office, expressed, as presi-
dent beseeched God for his blessing and bewailed the country's
sins."
Congress, which from the start had appropriated money for reli-
gious purposes, went right on appropriating it. In the 1820s, it
funded the American Board of Foreign Missionaries, a Congrega-
6. JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 159-60 (1987).
7. 1 Stat. 71 (1789); see 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2180 (1834).
8. 1 Stat. 222 (1789) (giving the president the power to employ chaplains for the Army).
9. 1 Stat. 50, 51-53 (1789). It has been argued that "in 1791 the establishment clause pre-
vented the United States from doing what half the fourteen states then permitted - giving gov-
ernment aid to religions on a non-preferential basis." LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 193-94 (1988). This statement appears to assume that the members
of the First Congress acted contrary to the amendment they proposed.
10. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 914-15 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (petitioning for a day of prayer and
thanksgiving).
II. E.g.., Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 304 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
. 12. 27 ANNALS OF CONG. 2673-74 (1813) (proclamation of James Madison, July 23, 1813). Cf.
James Madison, Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments, reprinted in
128 HARPER'S 489 (1914) (arguing that all laws should be based on the premise of separation of
church and state).
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tionalist enterprise evangelizing the Indians. 3 Most of the schools
developed during the nineteenth century for the Indians were either
Catholic or Protestant schools paid for by Congress."' Congress ap-
propriated money for a Baptist institution - Columbia College,
which later became George Washington University.' 5 Congress
funded a small Jesuit school - Georgetown - then as now oper-
ated by the Society of Jesus.' 6 None of these aids to the establish-
ment of religion appeared to bother Congress. The Bill of Rights
was there; it was no barrier to what actually was done.
Yet despite the absence of any intervention by a court, despite all
the activity promoting religion, there was a sense that America was
the land of religious freedom. It was our ideology even if it was not
our legal practice. On that subject, I refer to the person who in
many ways was and still remains the most eloquent articulator of
the American ideal, Alexis de Tocqueville.
Tocqueville came over here as a young French lawyer on a kind
of boondoggle: he had government authorization to do research on
American prisons. Once he got here he spent his time observing our
society. He took a particular interest in religion. His analysis of the
place of religion in America is one of the great moments in his De-
mocracy In America. He wrote:
Upon my arrival in the United States it was the religious aspect of the coun-
try that first struck my attention. The more I stayed the more I saw the
great political consequences flowing from facts new to me. I had seen among
us the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty working almost always in
opposite directions. Here I found them intimately united to each other; to-
gether they ruled the same ground. Each day I felt my desire increase to
know the cause of this phenomenon.
In order to learn, I questioned the faithful of all communions; I sought
especially the society of the clergy, who are depositories of the different be-
liefs and have a personal interest in their duration. The religion that I pro-
fess brought me in particular relationship to the Catholic clergy, and I did
not delay in forming a kind of intimacy with several of its members. To each
of them I expressed my astonishment and set out my doubt. I found that all
these men differed with one another only as to details. All principally attrib-
uted the peaceful empire that religion exercises in their country to the com-
plete separation of the Church and the State. I am not afraid to affirm that
13. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 529 (1832).
14. See FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE CHURCHES AND THE INDIAN SCHOOLS 1888-1912, at 3-31
(1979).
15. 4 Stat. 603 (1832).
16. 6 Stat. 538 (1833).
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during my stay in America I did not meet a single man, cleric or lay, who
was not in agreement on this point.1"
A rosy-eyed view of the actual situation affected Tocqueville. But he
faithfully reflects our ideology.
Reflecting on his American experience and meaning to offer a les-
son to his French compatriots, Tocqueville added:
As long as a religion rests only on the sentiments which are the consolation
of every misery, it can draw to itself the hearts of the human race. Mixed in
the bitter passions of this world, it is compelled sometimes to defend allies
given to it by interest, rather than love; and it is -necessary for it to repulse
as opponents men who often still love it while they fight those to whom it
has become united. Religion, therefore, cannot share the material power of a
government without burdening itself with a portion of the hate that power
generates.' 8
From this conclusion, it followed for Tocqueville that "religion
should found its empire only upon the desire of immortality, which
lives in every human heart" and should not concern itself with polit-
ical affairs.1 9
I plan to return to this last quotation. Let me say now that Toc-
queville faithfully reflects a popular point of view. It is a seductive
point of view. I believe it .is a profoundly wrong point of view. But
one feels the attraction.
Here then was the situation as it stood from 1791 to 1940: a Bill
of Rights that was unique, an ideology that favored liberty, and a
practice which ignored the text. Governmentally, there was, as the
Supreme Court once put it, a mass of benevolent utterances in favor
of religion.2 0 No Supreme Court precedent upheld the freedom of
religion. If you picked up a constitutional law book in 1900 or 1910
or 1920 or 1930, the only reference you would have seen to freedom
of religion would have been the Mormon cases. In the Mormon
cases, the attempts of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints to invoke that religious freedom had been rejected by the
United States Supreme Court.21
17. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DEMOCRATIE EN AMERIQUE (1835) (translated by
author).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
21. See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
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Then the change came. The first and possibly most interesting
question perhaps is, Why? What happened in 1940 that made
change conceivable, desirable, actual? We may speculate. I have not
seen any definitive study. I offer some suggestions.
First of all, there were precedents going back to the 1920s when
this or that portion of the Bill of Rights began to be incorporated
into Due Process and so applied through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the states. A process was going on that made the legal cul-
ture different from the pre-Fourteenth Amendment world, where
nothing in the Bill of Rights applied to the states. Precedent existed
for moving some of the First Amendment into the Constitution and
so channelling state action.22
More important to my mind was what was going on in Europe. I
am a fairly strong believer in atrocities generating significant reac-
tions. What was going on in Europe were terrible suppressions in
Nazi Germany above all, but also, of course, in the Soviet Union
and Fascist Italy. The events made people who were aware of them
think about the value of religious liberty. A sense developed that we
had to do more to protect our religious liberty at a time when it was
being so terribly abused in Europe.
Then there was the almost accidental. There had to be some
agent of change. The agents were somewhat accidental, but they
deserve credit nonetheless. The agents of change were the Jehovah's
Witnesses, a small fundamentalist sect, which throughout the 1930s
kept raising the banner of free exercise in the face of hostile govern-
ment action. A biblically oriented group, the Witnesses really took
seriously the gospel parable that even an unjust judge will yield if
you keep knocking at his door. 23 Time and again the United States
Supreme Court denied the Witnesses' petitions for certiorari from
state decisions denying them religious liberty. Then finally, in 1940
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided Cantwell v. Con-
necticut24 and declared that states were bound by the First Amend-
ment obligation to permit religion to be freely exercised.25 The Su-
preme Court did so on behalf of a Jehovah's Witness who had been
peddling Witness literature on the streets of New Haven stating
22. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) ("It is possible that some of the per-
sonal rights safeguarded by the first eight amendments against National action may also be safe-
guarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.").
23. Luke 18:1-6.
24. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
25. Id. at 303.
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that religion was a racket and playing a phonograph record attack-
ing the Catholic Church. Cantwell was charged with breach of the
peace for his behavior and with soliciting funds without the requisite
license from the secretary of state of Connecticut. 6 His actions vio-
lated two general laws - the ordinary municipal ordinance of the
city of New Haven as to breach of peace and the solicitation law of
the state. Both of them were held to be unconstitutional in restrict-
ing this Jehovah's Witness's activity in promoting his religion.17
Cantwell was followed quite shortly by Murdock v. Pennsylva-
nia," where, again, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses asserted a claim
to religious freedom. This time the Witnesses had had the practice
of descending on small towns in the middle of Pennsylvania on Sun-
days, going door-to-door distributing their literature or peddling it.2 9
The towns were largely Catholic. The townsfolk did not like being
disturbed on Sundays. They passed ordinances regulating all door-
to-door solicitation. 30 The ordinances were declared unconstitu-
tional. They were restrictions of what, Justice Douglas wrote, was
the same as preaching.31 The practice regulated was a well-known
way of spreading the Gospel; it went back to the Apostles. The Je-
hovah's Witnesses should be allowed to practice their religion and
preach it without restriction. Even though the ordinances applied
across the board to all persons selling or pushing periodicals, they
were unconstitutional because they restrained a familiar way of
presenting the Gospel. 2
The climactic decision for the Jehovah's Witnesses came when
they won the flag salute case. The flag salute was to the Witnesses a
form of idolatry forbidden by the verse in Exodus against idolatry.3
Witnesses told their children not to give the flag salute at school.
They would risk having the children expelled as truants; they would
risk going to jail themselves as parents contributing to the delin-
quency of minors. They were willing to be martyrs in a number of
states throughout the Union where the flag salute was required.
26. Id. at 301-03.
27. Id. at 303, 307.
28. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
29. Id. at 106.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 109.
33. Exodus 20:3-5.
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When in Minersville School District v. Gobitis3 4 the issue was
first presented to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Frank-
furter for the Court wrote an opinion upholding the salute. In the
Court's view, the requirement was meant to insure national security
by insuring national unity, establishing a national symbol." The
claims of the Jehovah's Witnesses to free exercise of conscience and
to free exercise of behavior could not stand against this important
national interest which the states had embodied in their law. 6
Very few decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been
subjected to such widespread and almost unanimous criticism rang-
ing from religious periodicals to liberal periodicals and law re-
views. 7 Within two years the majority had shifted. In West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette," the Supreme Court took a
different position and, in the name of freedom of speech, held that
the state could not compel the expression of belief by requiring
schoolchildren to salute the flag.3 9 Read very narrowly, Barnette did
not overrule Gobitis, but in every practical way it did. Justice
Frankfurter found himself writing a very bitter dissent,40 while Jus-
tice Jackson in clarion terms declared, "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe" what is our belief."' Jackson's majority opinion was
in effect a ringing endorsement of religious freedom although it
went further to endorse freedom of thought of any kind, religious or
nonreligious. 2
The Witnesses had won the field. After that a number of deci-
sions came down upholding free exercise. Probably the most signifi-
cant was Wisconsin v. Yoder,4 3 holding that the Amish could claim
free exercise as a reason for not sending their children to high
school. The Amish position was that the Amish religion was such
that it would be irretrievably damaged by exposing adolescent
34. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
35. Id. at 595.
36. Id.
37. See NOONAN, supra note 6, at 250-51.
38. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
39. Id. at 642.
40. Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
41. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
42. Id.
43. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. Id. at 207.
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Amish to high school."5 The Amish did not offer to establish an
Amish high school. They simply said high school was incompatible
with their way of life." The Supreme Court accepted this religious
stance as trumping the general education laws of the state of
Wisconsin. 7
These were notable victories for the small religious bodies con-
cerned - for the Amish, for the Jehovah's Witnesses, for the Sev-
enth-day Adventists, all tiny groups with scarcely detectable impact
on mainstream America. The organs of the state that were over-
come were school boards, motor vehicle departments, municipal po-
lice. The victories upheld the freedom to be a minister and run for
political office;48 the freedom to solicit contributions for one's faith
by attacking another faith;49 the freedom to distribute door-to-door
religious literature;50 the freedom not to be photographed for a
driver's license;51 the freedom of an atheist not to take an oath call-
ing on God;52 the freedom of a Seventh-Day Adventist not to work
on Saturdays; 53 and, of course, the freedom not to pledge allegiance
to the flag.5 It is not a notable list of freedoms. Very few of them
relate to any substantial community activity; the majority are
negative.
None of the liberties championed by the United States Supreme
Court were championed against Congress. The First Amendment
said, "Congress shall make no law . . . .- The United States Su-
preme Court never found a law made by Congress to infringe reli-
gious liberty. The blandness of the academic acolytes of the Court
conceals that dismaying fact. The Court has been portrayed as the
champion of religious liberty. It has not been the champion against
the co-equal federal branch of government, whose power the
Amendment had been written to curb. If you were a legal realist
you would say that Congress can do what it wants and will not be
stopped by any citizen invoking free exercise of religion.
45. Id. at 211-12.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 234.
48. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
49. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
50. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
51. Quaring v. Peterson, 472 U.S. 478 (1975) (per curiam).
52. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
53. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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As to things important to the national interest, religion has not
been tolerated as a reason for objection. As to the draft, draft ex-
emptions came only by the grace of Congress. Congress gave prefer-
ence to the so-called historic peace churches such as the Quakers,
total pacifists. Other religions might not apply. That kind of dis-
crimination in favor of one religious approach over another, that
kind of nonrecognition of the consciences of religious believers, was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court.56 Similarly, where any
objections were made on religious grounds to the taxing power of
Congress, the taxing power trumped the religious claim.57
Where your treasure is there will be your heart, as the Gospel has
it.518 For the national government, the ability to raise troops and the
ability to tax was where its heart was. The national court was not
going to intrude upon those sacred national powers. If you take
Emile Durkheim's view of what religion is, nothing else could have
been expected. In that secular sociological view, religion is the ex-
pression of the collectivity. 59 The collectivity is not going to turn
against itself. Free exercise is an illusion. The decisions of the Su-
preme Court show that it is an illusion.
The illusion was not commented on by the constitutional law
scholars in general. Only in recent times has a leading constitutional
law scholar, Michael McConnell of the University of Chicago,
asked, What do we have? and suggested that we have a Potemkin
village.6" A Potemkin village in its modern form was a pretty little
village put up by the Soviet Union to deceive well-meaning foreign-
ers into believing that things were going very well in the Soviet
Union because here was a prosperous little village. McConnell's
point is that we have something similar to show to foreigners; we
have cases defending religious liberty in ringing terms in basically
small ways for socially marginal groups of people. Yet we have had
the ideology; we had the penumbra, if you like, of religious freedom.
56. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). For an alternative view, see Justice Doug-
las's dissent in Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437, 463 (1971), a decision that was subsumed under
the Gillette decision.
57. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Congress although provided an exemption on
religious grounds for self-employed Amish and others. Id. at 260.
58. Luke 12:34.
59. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 63 (Joseph Ward
Smith trans., Free Press 1963) (1947).
60. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1110 (1990). As McConnell has put it more recently, we have "a mess." Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992).
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All of that has been challenged, perhaps taken away in the third
phase.
The third phase was ushered in abruptly by Employment Division
v. Smith" in 1990. In that case, in an opinion by Justice Scalia that
garnered four votes besides his own, two persons who were believers
in the Native Indian religion that uses peyote as a sacrament took
the sacrament in apparent violation of Oregon criminal law, which
did not make an exception for the sacramental use of peyote. The
two believers were fired from their jobs because of their action. 62
They appealed to free exercise, and the Supreme Court rejected
their claim, rejected it because, as Justice Scalia wrote, the general
law of the state must prevail.63 Unless the law was specifically de-
voted to persecuting a religion, the general law would trump the
claim of religion.64
Although there was a cosmetic attempt to save some of the previ-
ous decisions, the fundamental proposition of Justice Scalia's opin-
ion undid the previous fifty years. On a fair reading of Smith, noth-
ing remained of the major decisions of the past to the extent that
they upheld the free exercise of religion against state action. To
drive that point home, Justice Scalia took the extraordinary step of
quoting Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the flag salute case.65 An
opinion that had been heatedly condemned on all sides, and repudi-
ated two years later by the Supreme Court, was now quoted by Jus-
tice Scalia as though it were good law, as though the new standards
were the Frankfurter standards restored. He made no acknowledg-
ment that Barnette had been the law since 1943.
The impact of Smith has not yet been fully felt. It may seem
strange to say that before Smith, although there was only a
Potemkin village to be blown away, nonetheless there were at least
cases to be appealed to, ideals to be invoked. But now you have a
whole series of areas were you can feel the heavy hand of Smith.
Take one instance from Massachusetts. The Jesuits at the Immacu-
late Conception Church in Boston, an old church, finally in 1990 got
around to turning their altar around to conform with the directives
of Vatican II; they made a change in the interior of the church. The
61. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
62. Id. at 874.
63. Id. at 879.
64. Id. at 877.
65. Id. at 879 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)).
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Boston Landmark Commission invoked Smith.6 No doubt there
was a general law, you cannot change historical landmarks.67 The
Jesuits had to litigate and go as far as the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts to maintain their freedom to rearrange their
church to conform to their doctrine. Instead of using, as it might
have in the past, the Federal Constitution, this court invoked the
Massachusetts Constitution to conclude that the Jesuits had a free
exercise right to change the position of their altar.68
Take a second case, which is a bit hypothetical: NLRB v. Catho-
lic Bishop of Chicago69 held a few years ago that because of the
special status of a church school, the National Labor Relations
Board could not order collective bargaining in a parochial school.
The guts of the decision were that such an order would intrude on a
religious interest. Now under Smith there is a general labor law and
there is not any reason for abstention on religious grounds. The ra-
tionale of Catholic Bishop of Chicago is so undermined that one can
well expect the intrusion of the Board into the parochial school.
Another area is that of the laws that have been enacted by a
number of states on the reporting Of child abuse. Those statutes typ-
ically make no exception for sacramental confession. 0 If child abuse
is reported in sacramental confession, there is a general law ordering
the abuse to be reported. Under Smith, there would be no defense
if, because of the religious seal of the sacrament, a priest declined to
report what had been confessed to him in the sacrament of penance.
Another example is close to my concerns as a law professor. Cath-
olic law schools now, by grace of the American Bar Association
(ABA), the accrediting agency, are able to maintain themselves as
religious law schools. The same is true of course of a Jewish law
school like Cardozo, or a Mormon law school like Brigham Young,
or an Evangelical law school like Oral Roberts. These schools can
maintain their religious identity only to the extent permitted by the
United States Constitution. That is the way the ABA has chosen to
phrase the permitted deviation from the secular norm.7 1 Under
66. See Society of Jesus v Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
67. Id. at 572.
68. Id. at 573.
69. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
70. See generally William N. Ivers, Note, When Must a Priest Report Under a Child Abuse
Reporting Statute? - Resolution to the Priests' Conflicting Duties, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 431
(1987).
71. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETA-
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Smith, I do not see how there is any latitude given. The general
rule, the ABA rule, is you may not discriminate as to race, or as to
sex, or as to religion. Religion is treated as one of the invidious dis-
criminations. If that is the general law, it would seem that under
Smith, it would be the law applicable to the religiously oriented law
schools; religious preferences would be unacceptable.
I am sure that those with experience in other fields could go on
finding areas where the reverberation of Smith will have a serious
impact on the corporate expression of religion. We do have, of
course, from the past a body of cases saying that not only does an
individual have a free exercise right, but the church does. Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral,72 upholding the right of the Soviet-domi-
nated patriarchate to have religious freedom, leads off that list. Not
so long ago, Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos 73 upheld that
principle in the Mormon context. But these cases are also called in
doubt by Smith.
We seem to be back almost with Toqueville's view of what reli-
gion is about. Religion, in the Smith perspective, seems to be innoc-
uous belief - belief that you keep to yourself. Toqueville's vision
was similar. It was strangely close to that of the anticlericals of his
day. Religion should stay in the cloister, the priest should stay in the
sacristy, the church should not meddle in politics. Justice Scalia's
view in Smith seems to be if it is action it can be ruled by the state.
There is no protection for the free exercise of religion as to acts that
are commanded or prohibited by the state.
Now, if Smith were the last word, then my title "The End of Free
Exercise?" would mean that we had reached the end, at least, for
the time being. But the title does contain not only a question but a
pun. The true end of religious freedom, the end for which it has
been instituted, the purpose of religious freedom, is action. We do
not live in an America in which the priest is condemned to the sac-
risty, in which the church is driven out of politics. The great over-
whelming social phenomenon is that since 1830 there have been five
movements that have had enormous impact on American society,
each of which has been a religious crusade.
When I say these movements have been crusades, I mean they
have had these badges of crusades: They have had leaders who were
TION, S.211 (1990).
72. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
73. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
1992]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
churchmen. They have used religious signs and symbols. They have
used Scripture as their text. They have made prayer integral to their
action. And they have spoken in God's name in what they
demanded.
Those five crusades have occurred in cycles of roughly forty years.
The first was the crusade to abolish slavery that began in 1830 and
substantially finished in 1870. That was a crusade led largely by
Congregationalists and Methodists. Then the second crusade began
in 1850 and ended in 1890, the crusade to abolish polygamy - a
crusade again of Congregationalists and Methodists, joined by
Presbyterians. It was a crusade that ended in the abolition of polyg-
amy as the first had ended in the abolition of slavery. The third
crusade got underway in the 1870s or 1880s and reached its climax
in 1920. That was to abolish the use of alcohol. There the Method-
ists took the lead, supported by one branch of the Lutherans. That
crusade, of course, did not attain its end except for a brief period.
The fourth crusade had its very dim beginnings in the 1930s and
reached its glorious climax in the 1960s; you can round it off at
1970 - the crusade to abolish discrimination based on race. Just as
the crusade for prohibition has been described as the Protestant
Church in action so this crusade has been described as the Black
Church in action.74 The entire Southern Christian Leadership was
composed of Baptist ministers. The organizations of the church were
used to raise money and recruit movement members. The symbols of
the church were used to motivate the Blacks of the South. Finally,
in recent time, and still in progress, is the crusade to abolish abor-
tion - something you may date as beginning in 1970, and if it is on
a forty-year cycle will end in approximately 2010. Here the
Catholics and the Fundamentalists and the Evangelicals have been
in the forefront. In those five movements, you do see the end of reli-
gious freedom, the free exercise of belief to influence society and
produce political results.
I want to go over in somewhat more detail the prototype of all of
these campaigns, the campaign to abolish slavery. It began in 1829,
in the Park Street Church in Boston, with a speech on the Fourth of
July by the Reverend William Lloyd Garrison calling for the end of
slavery in the United States. 5 Garrison's solitary cry was then
picked up by 124 Congregational ministers, who issued a declara-
74. See BAYARD RUSTIN, STRATEGIES FOR FREEDOM 38-43 (1976).
75. NOONAN, supra note 6, at 169.
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tion in 1834 calling on their fellow ministers to spread the word to
their parishioners that slavery was unacceptable, that it was against
the law of God, that there could be no compromise with slavery. 6 A
significant book of the movement was entitled The Bible Against
Slavery." A network of clergy spread the word throughout the
Northern states and developed a small, dissident, unpleasant move-
ment that was cordially disliked by the people who preferred the
status quo but which spoke to the consciences of some. The issue -
unusual for American politics - was not economic; but the appeal
to conscience spoke to some. In the 1840s came the war against
Mexico. A dissident group refused to endorse the war because it was
a war to expand slavery. The Conscience Whigs, as they were
called, set their consciences against the expansion .7 Then you had
the Compromise of 1850, passed by the Congress and denounced by
the religionists because it was a compromise.79 The senior senator
from Massachusetts, Daniel Webster, was condemned by Boston's
leading Unitarian minister, Theodore Parker, because he had com-
promised his conscience. Parker, denouncing Webster, quoted the
terrible words, "They enslave their children's children, who compro-
mise with sin."80
The religious campaign went on as a drumbeat through the
1850s. Finally the Supreme Court decided in a made-up case to
solve it all, to provide a final solution in the Dred Scott decision. 1
The Court decided that a person born of black slaves could never
become a citizen of the United States and that Congress had no
power to restrict the spread of slavery into the territories. 2 That
decision, far from ending the controversy with a tidy legal solution,
drew denunciation not only from the Congregationalists and the
Unitarians but from the Methodists and the Presbyterians. Antislav-
ery was now a major religious cause.8
Then the war came. When the war came, it was entirely congru-
ent with the war's religious roots that The Battle Hymn of the Re-
76. Id. at 168.
77. THEODORE DWIGHT WELD, THE BIBLE AGAINST SLAVERY (New York, American Anti-
Slavery Society 1838); see NOONAN, supra note 6, at 169.
78. NOONAN, supra note 6, at 170.
79. Id. at 170-71.
80. Theodore Parker, Mr. Webster's Speech, in II PARKER T.: WORKS 247 (James K. Hosmer
ed., 1907).
81. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
82. Id. at 426-27, 452.
83. NOONAN, supra note 6, at 177.
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public should proclaim that God was marching on.84 God, the aboli-
tionists were sure, was on the Union's side. When Abraham Lincoln
finally issued the Emancipation Proclamation he told his cabinet in
so many words that he had made a covenant with God to issue the
proclamation. 5 At every turn, action in this prototypical crusade
was dictated by conscience, and religion was turned from belief into
action.
You need not agree with the ends of any of these crusades, but no
one, I think, can deny that ours is a country that has been shaped
by them. This shaping has been the end of free exercise.
84. FLORENCE HOWE HALL, THE STORY OF THE BATTLE HYMN OF THE REPUBLIC 1-2 (1916).
85. Gideon Welles, Entry of September 22, 1962, in DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES 143 (Howard
K. Beale ed., 1969).
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